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I estimate how intra-household bargaining affects gay and lesbian couples’ labor 
supplies, investigating their similarity to heterosexual decision-making, in a 
collective household framework.  
Data from the 2000 US Census shows that couples of all types exhibit a significant 
response to bargaining power shifts, as measured by differences between partners in 
age or non-labor income. In gay, lesbian, and heterosexual cohabiting couples, a 
relatively young or rich partner has more bargaining power and hence supplies less 
labor, the opposite holding for his/her mate. Married couples value the older 
spouse instead, or the richer. No effects are found for same-sex roommates. 
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  31.  Introduction 
  This paper examines the labor supply choices of gay and lesbian couples, to explore 
the role of intra-household bargaining power in same-sex household decision making. A 
large body of theoretical and empirical literature models and shows that the intra-household 
distribution of power influences heterosexual households’ outcomes (Chiappori, Fortin, 
Lacroix, 2002, Browning, Bourguignon, Chiappori, Lechene, 1994, Browning, Chiappori, 
1998, Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). In particular, the 
collective household behavior model predicts that household members make Pareto-
efficient decisions according to their respective bargaining power positions, which in turn 
depend on outside opportunities and social and legal factors, such as members’ relative 
share of non-labor income, their age differences, and abortion and divorce laws (Browning 
et al., 1994, Chiappori et al., 2002, Oreffice, 2007, Thomas, 1990).  
However, all this literature is centered on heterosexual families, while nowadays 
there is an important legal and cultural movement toward the legalization of same-sex 
marriages as couples with the same rights and status as heterosexuals, e.g. the California’s 
Supreme Court ruling legalizing same-sex marriages, and the New York governor 
providing legal status to same-sex marriages performed elsewhere (May 2008). These 
recent social changes, along with the sizable presence of homosexual partnerships 
throughout the country, prompt the compelling question of whether the household 
economics developed around heterosexual families directly applies to gay and lesbian 
family behavior, and how similarly to heterosexual couples. 
I analyze same-sex couples’ labor supplies as a household decision, testing their 
response to intra-household bargaining power, and their consistency with the collective 
household labor supply behavior predicted for heterosexual couples. In particular, I focus 
on how gay and lesbian households’ balance of power and labor supplies are responsive to 
differences in age and non-labor income between partners. 
Economic studies of same-sex couples present both similarities and differences with 
heterosexual households. Black, Sanders, Taylor (2007) assume that families’ preferences 
do not systematically differ by sexual orientation. They instead emphasize the differences 
in biological constraints, affecting homosexuals’ fertility, location, household specialization 
and human capital choices. The similarities in family preferences is also found by Jepsen 
and Jepsen (2002), in terms of positive assortative mating for non-labor and labor market 
  4traits across all types of couples, even though to a smaller extent for same-sex couples. 
Becker (1991) highlights the disparities between homosexual unions and heterosexual 
marriages due to the lack of difference in comparative advantage between partners and to 
the presence of complementarities, stating that same-sex households are less efficient than 
heterosexual ones. Jepsen and Jepsen (2006) and Tebaldi and Elmslie (2006) directly link 
sexual orientation to same-sex partners’ labor supply. However, the former study considers 
labor supply an exogenous variable. The latter analyzes the determinants of individual labor 
supply of same-sex partners, but each partner’s labor supply decision is assumed to depend 
only on his/her own characteristics, completely disregarding the influence of the other 
partner, and the household dimension of labor supply decisions. Finally, there is evidence 
in the literature of persistent wage disparities among gay, lesbian and heterosexual workers, 
with lesbians earning significantly more than heterosexual women, and gay men earning 
significantly less than heterosexual men (e.g. Allegretto and Arthur, 2001, Black, Makar, 
Sanders, Taylor, 2003, Blandford, 2003, Jepsen, 2007). 
However, none of these studies examines the labor supply choices of same-sex 
couples as a household endogenous decision. I test whether same-sex couples make 
efficient labor supply choices influenced by partners’ bargaining power, as it is found to be 
the case for heterosexual households, and investigate possible differences in these effects 
across lesbian, gay, heterosexual cohabiting and married couples. Pairs of same-sex male 
and female roommates are used as comparison group. Black et al. (2007) and Jepsen and 
Jepsen (2002) suggest that family preferences do not depend on sexual orientation, I want 
to check whether the intra-household decision process and bargaining power as well do not 
vary with sexual orientation.  
I focus on the differences in age and non-labor income ownership between partners, 
as indicators of intra-household bargaining power. The distribution of these traits within a 
couple, which captures  each partner’s outside opportunities, is considered to affect the 
household members’ bargaining position and to have a significant impact on household 
choices, such as labor supply, clothing expenditure and children’s health (Browning et al., 
1994, Schultz, 1990, Thomas, 1990, Grossbard-Shechtman, 1993). Psychologists as well 
report that the partner with greater financial resources has greater power, also in same-sex 
couples (Caldwell and Peplau, 1984, Patterson, 2000). When a partner has a relatively 
better trait (relatively richer or younger/older), the distribution of gains from the 
relationship would shift in his/her favor, generating opposite income effects on the partners. 
  5Consequently, the partner with a more favorable bargaining position would decrease his/her 
labor supply, while his/her mate would increase his/hers (Browning et al. 1994, Chiappori 
et al., 2002).  I also test restrictions on these partners’ labor supply responses,, which are 
predicted by the collective household labor supply model, and compute the sharing rule 
partners use to divide their household non-labor resources, highlighting the role of the age 
and non-labor income differences in determining the income transfers within households. 
This evidence would strengthen the consistency and interpretation of my findings, since it 
is very unlikely to hold unless the bargaining power explanation and the collective 
household approach are correct for same-sex couples as well, rejecting the unitary model 
prediction that bargaining power forces are irrelevant to intra-household decisions. 
  I use Census data for the year 2000, the five-percent sample of the Public Use 
Microdata Set (PUMS), which provides the most recent largest sample of gay and lesbian 
partners and their detailed demographic, labor and income information, along with standard 
samples of heterosexual individuals. These data allow to identify only members of same-
sex couples but not single gays or lesbians. This limitation represents a lesser concern here, 
because my analysis applies to couples. My identification strategy consists of estimating 
the effects of intra-household age and non-labor income differences on both partners’ labor 
supplies, and comparing changes in their labor supplies cross-sectionally among gay, 
lesbian, heterosexual couples and roommates. 
My empirical analysis reveals that a relatively lower age (higher non-labor income) 
significantly reduces the younger (richer) partner’s labor supply, while it significantly 
increases the labor supply of his/her relatively poorer (older) mate, controlling for both 
partners’ wages, education and other individual and household characteristics. Results are 
similar for gay, lesbian and heterosexual cohabiting couples alike, while married 
(heterosexual) couples display more bargaining power for the older spouse, and somewhat 
smaller labor supply effects. Consistently with the intra-household bargaining 
interpretation, same-sex pairs of roommates do not show any significant impact. In 
particular, in same-sex couples I find that being 5 years younger than your lesbian partner 
reduces your labor supply by around 23 annual hours, while it increases your mate’s labor 
supply by about 35 annual hours, the figures being 23 and 37, respectively, for gay couples. 
Owning five thousand dollars more non-labor income than your lesbian partner reduces 
your labor supply by around 19 annual hours, while it increases your mate’s labor supply 
by about 47 annual hours (32 and 41 for gay partners).  
  6These findings represent the first empirical support for gay and lesbian households’ 
labor supplies to be affected by bargaining power forces, according to the household 
behavior framework predicted for heterosexual households.  
 Alternative  explanations  such as the role of age and non-labor income on individual 
preferences for leisure, age and income differences as proxies for local labor market 
conditions and attitudes toward gays and lesbians, household labor specialization, and the 
misreporting of unmarried homosexual partners in the 2000 Census sample are considered. 
I argue that these phenomena cannot consistently explain my results, given my intra-
household bargaining predictions and empirical evidence. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework. 
Section 3 describes the empirical specification and data. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 considers alternative explanations for the findings. Section 6 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
  I apply the collective household labor supply model with distribution factors, 
developed by Chiappori et. al. (2002), to same-sex couples
1. A household is composed of 
two decision makers, head and partner, each having a distinct utility function on 
consumption and leisure. Households are assumed to make Pareto-efficient decisions about 
each member’s leisure and consumption. Preferences are egoistic, in that one mate’s utility 
does not depend on the other’s consumption or leisure, although the model can be extended 
to allow for caring preferences and also public goods. Let h
i  and C
i  for i = h, p denote 
member i’s labor supply and consumption of a private composite good (whose price is 
normalized to unity). The utility function of member i is U , where U is 
strictly quasi-concave, increasing, and continuously differentiable for i = h, p, and z 
represents preference parameters, such as education of the two mates. Let y denote 
household non-labor income and w
) , , h 1 ( z C
i i i −
                                                
i the wage rate of mate i. Finally, let s1 and s2 denote two 
distribution factors, variables that affect the intra-household decision process, but not 
individual preferences or the joint consumption set. The two bargaining power factors 
 
1 I also consider heterosexual couples in my empirical analysis. 
  7considered in this analysis are the differences between mates in non-labor income and age. 
For simplicity, I abstract from the non-pecuniary benefits of companionship. I follow 
convention and assume that the utility from companionship is additive; in particular, it does 
not influence the trade-off between leisure and consumption. 
The optimal allocations of labor supply of each mate are determined by the 
following program:  
) , , 1 ( max
, z C h U
h h h
C h




h h w z s s y w w C + ≤ ) , , , , , ( 2 1 ϕ  
The partner faces a symmetric problem,  ) , , , , , ( 2 1 z s s y w w p h ϕ representing the 
head’s share of non-labor income y, and the partner receiving y - ) , , , , , ( 2 1 z s s y w w p h ϕ . This 
sharing rule ) , , , , , ( 2 1 z s s y w w p h ϕ with which mates divide their non-labor household 
resources is Pareto-optimally chosen by the couple and depends on the balance of 
bargaining power. In particular, the stronger the head’s bargaining power, the higher his/her 
share of non-labor income and the lower his/her partner’s. The sharing 
rule ) , , , , , ( 2 1 z s s y w w p h ϕ is a function of prices (here normalized to unity), mates’ wages, 
household non-labor income, distribution factors (here the non-labor income gap and age 
gap)
2, and other observable characteristics z (preference parameters).  
Solving these maximization problems yields the following equilibrium labor supply 
functions of the two mates:  
] ), , , , , , ( , [ 2 1 z z s s y w w w h h p h h
h h ϕ =  
] ), , , , , , ( , [ 2 1 z z s s y w w y w h h p h p
p p ϕ − = . 
                                                 
2 The sex ratio, divorce laws, abortion legalization, alimony, and child benefits laws, are other examples of 
distribution factors that have been studied in the literature on heterosexual households (Chiappori et al, 2002, 
Lundberg and Pollak, 1996, Oreffice, 2007). 
  8The derivatives of each labor supply function with respect to the second arguments 
are unambiguously negative, reflecting a pure income effect. Hence, factors that strengthen 
the head’s bargaining power reduce the labor supplied by the head and increase the labor 
supplied by the partner, ceteris paribus, in particular controlling for own wage and the 
couples’ total non-labor income y. I investigate whether same-sex couples respond to such 
factors in the direction predicted by the theory, by testing their impact on these couples’ 
labor supplies, and comparing it to the corresponding effects on heterosexual cohabiting 
and married couples. Pairs of same-sex roommates are also considered, as control group. 
Roommates share the mere cohabiting aspects of couples, but do not constitute a household 
or couple, so that their relationship does not involve intra-household bargaining and 
household decision making. Therefore, their labor supplies should not be affected by the 
bargaining power shifts illustrated above, and the collective household model predictions 
should not hold in their case. 
  This theoretical framework imposes further restrictions on the partners’ labor 
supplies and on the parameters of the sharing rule, which I test in my empirical analysis. 

























Second, the sharing rule can be recovered up to an additive function k(z) and the 
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All these predictions are very unlikely to be fulfilled unless my bargaining power 
explanation and the collective household approach are correct and applicable to same-sex 
                                                 
3 Propositions 1 and 3 in Chiappori et al. (2002). 
4 Proposition 3 in Chiappori et al.(2002). These conditions hold provided that , where is the 








  9couples as well. They would show that distribution factors have sizable effects on same-sex 
households’ decisions, and would reject the unitary model prediction that bargaining power 
forces are irrelevant to intra-household decisions. In particular, a significant impact of the 
non-labor income difference on partners’ labor supplies represents a rejection of the income 
pooling hypothesis, which has been empirically rejected for heterosexual households 
(Browning et al., 1994, Schultz, 1990, Thomas, 1990). 
 
3.   Empirical Specification and Data 
3.1.  Identification Strategy 
My main sample consists of gay and lesbian couples with both partners between 18 and 65 
years of age. I also consider heterosexual cohabiting and married men and women, and 
roommates, all in the same age bracket. Moreover, all individuals in my samples are not in 
school, not in the military, and not in a farm household. A couple consists of the head of the 
household and his/her unmarried partner, spouse or roommate. I include intact couples only 
if both the head and the mate are actually present, while I exclude households where there 
are multiple mates, or more than two adults.  
The following equations for labor supply are estimated for heads and partners, and 
run on each type of couples, gay, lesbian, male roommates, female roommates, 
heterosexual cohabiting, and married couples: 
h p h h X diff age diff y y w w h ε δ γ γ α α α + + + + + + = _ _ ln ln 2 1 3 2 1  
p p h p X diff age diff y y w w h ε ψ λ λ β β β + + + + + + = _ _ ln ln 2 1 3 2 1  
y_diff and age_diff are the two bargaining power factors under consideration. The former is 
defined as the head’s total non-labor income in dollars minus the partner’s total non-labor 
income in dollars, while the latter as the head’s age in years minus the partner’s age in 
years (for heterosexual couples, it is the male mate/spouse’s trait minus the female 
  10mate/spouse’s trait
5). Both the individual non-labor income and age variables  do  not  have  
any missing values and their differences can be either positive or negative, or zero
6.  
My identification strategy of these bargaining power effects consists of 
estimating 1 γ and 2 γ for heads, and 1 λ and 2 λ for partners. The impact of the non-labor income 
(age) difference on the labor supply of heads and partners is captured 
by 1 γ and 1 λ ( 2 γ and 2 λ ) respectively. According to the theory, if a partner is relatively richer, 
or being relatively young is a favorable trait, then his/her labor supply should decline and 
the labor supply of his/her mate should increase. Hence, 1 γ and 2 λ should be negative, 
while 2 γ and 1 λ should be positive. 
The other regressors are the wage rate  of each mate i = h, p, the couple’s total 
non-labor income y
i w
7, and a vector of covariates X. X includes education of each partner, 
number of each partner’s own children living in the household, and only own age of mate i, 
so that the effect of age_diff can be identified. A dummy variable for being black rather 
than white is also included at the household level, since I drop the few interracial unions 
present in my samples, and my main specifications focus on black or white couples
8. X 
also includes state fixed effects, which should capture the different labor market 
opportunities and social and legal attitudes toward gays and lesbians that exist across states. 
Alternatively, I include the state unemployment rate, the state total labor force participation 
and female labor force participation, to control for the level of economic activity in a state 
and especially for employment opportunities, and dummy variables for the presence in a 
                                                 
5 Heterosexual mates are distinguished according to their gender. As customary in studies of heterosexual 
households, the emphasis is on the role and behavior of male members versus female members, rather than on 
the Census definition of head and unmarried partner/spouse, where the head is the individual who owns the 
housing unit or signs the rental contract, and the partner/spouse is the individual who identifies 
himself/herself as such.  
6 The ratio of non-labor incomes and the ratio of ages were used as alternative distribution factors. However, 
the former is not defined for the several couples with no non-labor income, and they both introduce non-
linearities in the labor supply equations. Even though the ratios yield the same pattern of bargaining power 
effects, the differences of non-labor incomes and ages are preferred in this analysis (as in Browning et al., 
1994). The difference (ratio) in educational attainment across partners was also explored, but it did not exhibit 
any impact on household labor supplies, as in Browning et al. (1994). 
7 All wage and income variables refer to the previous year (1999). I discard individuals who are self-
employed, so that wages only reflect income from wages and salaries, and non-labor income is constructed as 
the individual’s total income minus earned income, where earned income coincides with wage income for 
non-self employed.   
8 Including other races such as Asians does not alter my bargaining power estimates. 
  11state of legal provisions for homosexual couples, such as domestic partnerships and civil 
unions.  
The dependent variable in my labor supply regressions is total annual hours worked 
in the previous year. Households in which either the head or the partner does not work are 
also included in my samples and I account for a possible selection bias toward working 
individuals by correcting for sample selection with Heckman MLE
9. As a source of 
identification, I use distributional assumptions on the first step residuals alone or exclusion 
restrictions
10. Both procedures yield similar robust results. I use predicted wages to 
measure the non-working mates’ wages and to address the possible endogeneity of 
individuals’ observed wages. To predict individuals’ wages, I take a standard human capital 
approach, also implemented in the collective labor supply literature (e.g., Donni, 2007), and 
consider a wage equation in which wage depends on the individual’s age, race, education, 
education squared, and cubed, but does not depend on his/her partner’s characteristics. This 
equation is then estimated separately for participating gays, lesbians, heterosexual male 
cohabitants, heterosexual female cohabitants, husbands, wives, male and female 
roommates, in my samples, with a correction for selection bias
11. The generated fitted 
values then replace the wage observations of the corresponding individuals in my 
samples
12. Finally, Wald tests of overall statistical significance performed on the above 
labor supply regressions do not reject the validity of the framework I use. 
The labor supply regressions are run using robust standard errors clustered by state, 
which allow for correlation of household observations within state. I alternatively clustered 
by metropolitan area, even though a metropolitan area has not been assigned to almost a 
third of the observations
13. My specifications do not use a differences-in-differences 
estimator: heads’ and partners’ regressions  are estimated separately, across types of 
couples. As such, they should not suffer from the understated standard errors highlighted by 
                                                 
9 I only exclude household observations where neither the head nor the partner work, given that this analysis 
measures bargaining power changes through labor supply.  
10 The latter is young children only affecting the participation decision but not labor supply. Tables report 
estimation with identification from statistical distribution assumptions. 
11 The participation decision depends on the number of children, dummies for age brackets, education, race 
and measures of local economy. 
12 Tables report estimation with the predicted partner/spouse’s and own wages.  
13 The Census reports that many metropolitan areas have only been partially identified in 2000, and that 
“users should not assume that the identified portion of a partly-identified metropolitan area is a representative 
sample of the entire metropolitan area”. Thus my main specifications are clustered by state. 
  12Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). At any rate, clustering by state (metropolitan 
area) should rectify such an underestimation, if it is present.   
 
3.2.  Additional Tests 
The collective labor supply framework provides additional testable restrictions on the 
impact of the non-labor income and age differences on mates’ labor supplies, and on how 
the sharing rule varies with the distribution factors, non-labor income, and wages of each 
mate, as illustrated in Section II. Specifically, I test the following interaction among the 










for each type of couples, lesbian, gay, and heterosexual. I also use the following conditions 
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where 3 1 3 1 β γ α λ − = Δ  and s1 and s2 are the non-labor income difference and age 
difference, respectively. Solving the above system of differential equations yields the 
following sharing rule equation:  
) ( ) _ _ ln ln (
1
1 2 1 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 z k diff age diff y y w w p h + + + + +
Δ
= λ γ λ γ λ α λ α γ β ϕ  
identifiable up to an additive term k(z), since z affects both the sharing rule and the 
preferences (Chiappori et al, 2002). All these conditions are tested and recovered through 




  13  14
3.3.  Data 
Estimation is carried out on Census data for the year 2000, specifically the five-percent 
sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS), which provides the most recent largest 
sample of gay and lesbian partners and their detailed demographic, labor and income 
information, along with standard samples of heterosexual individuals. Unmarried “heads” 
and “unmarried partners”, “heads” and “roommates”, and a random sample (10 percent) of 
married “heads” and “spouses” were extracted from the Census. Records in these files were 
then matched on the household identification code “serial” to create a single observation for 
each couple. All individuals with imputed values for sex, marital status, and relationship to 
the head of the household were excluded from my samples (subsection V.IV explains the 
relevance of this procedure). Couples with the head and the partner sharing the same gender 
were then identified as same-sex couples, gay and lesbian. In the Census, gays and lesbians 
are identified by their cohabiting relationship, a household being recorded as a same-sex 
union if the “relationship to head” is specified as “unmarried partner”, so that single gays or 
lesbians can not be recovered. This limitation represents a lesser concern here, because my 
analysis applies to couples. However, most economic studies on homosexuals use Census 
data, of 1990 or 2000. Others (e.g. Black et al., 2003, Blandford, 2003) use the General 
Social Survey (GSS) data, where single gays and lesbians can be identified, but the sample 
size is much smaller than in the Census data, and sexual orientation is inferred from self-
reported sexual activity. 
Individual weights are used to make the sample representative of the US population 
and economy. The state unemployment rate, state total labor force participation and female 
labor force participation are retrieved from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
  Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the heads’ and partners’ main 
variables, by type of couple. In the same-sex samples, gays and lesbians on average work 
similar annual hours, earn a similar hourly wage, and their education and age are also 
comparable. However, within both gays and lesbian couples, heads work more hours than 
their partners, earn a higher wage, and are  slightly  more educated and  older.  On  average,    15
ale Mates























Table 1. Summary Statistics
              Heads                Partners              Heads                 Partners              Male Mates                Fem
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev me
Age_diff 0.83 6.72 0.83 6.72 1.57 7.92 1.57 7.92 1.71 6.6 1.71
Y_diff 880.4 11380 880.4 11380 1765 19971 1765 19971 35.16 12695 35.16
Hours worked* 2069 537.06 1990.1 567.66 2185 615.72 2065.1 615.88 1958.6 837.64 1663
Log of wage* 3.02 0.35 2.35 0.68 3.09 0.31 2.37 0.64 2.87 0.28 2.01
Age 38.42 9.03 37.6 8.98 41.17 8.88 38.66 9.19 39.22 9.45 37.51
Education 14.4 2.33 14.12 2.36 14.63 2.19 14.22 2.27 12.73 2.2 12.93
Couple's non-labor income Y 3799 12340 3799 12340 6809 21461 6809 21461 4072 13628 4072
Number of children 0.36 0.78 0.056 0.28 0.12 0.51 0.11 0.14 0.351 0.825 0.54
Dummy for black 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.16 0.36 0.16
Number of observations 2950 2950 2588 2588 68762 68762
              Heads                Partners              Heads                 Partners              Husbands
Variable mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev mean  std. dev me
Age_diff 1.24 7.24 1.24 7.24 1.28 7.24 1.28 7.24 2.14 4.46 2.14
Y_diff 891.9 12418 891.88 12418 1044 12249 1044 12249 2898 17062 2898
Hours worked* 1989 636.04 1936 649.81 2081 671.75 2023 675.4 2108 788 1318
Log of wage* 2.81 0.26 2.72 0.25 2.85 0.29 2.76 0.24 3.18 0.36 1.96
Age 35.54 11.79 34.3 11.57 32.96 10.48 31.68 9.65 44.09 10.48 41.95
Education 14.24 2.33 14.04 2.32 13.68 2.31 13.43 2.3 13.43 2.48 13.35
Couple's non-labor income Y 4482 15284 4482 15284 3524 13907 3524 13907 5926 19699 5926
Number of children 0.213 0.62 0.025 0.2 0.036 0.245 0.003 0.06 1.29 1.2 1.29
Dummy for black 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 0.08 0.27 0.08
Number of observations 8480 8480 9657 9657 96650 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
In heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait. 
*For women and men with positive hours of work.  
Lesbian Couples Gay Couples Heterosexual Cohabiting Couple
Female Roommates Male Roommates Heterosexual Married
 the age difference is about .83 for lesbians and 1.57 years for gays, and the non-labor 
income difference is around $ 1,765 for gays and $ 880 for lesbians. Heterosexual couples 
exhibit a higher annual labor supply and wage for male than female mates, with the 
stronger disparity within married couples, while their educational attainment is lower than 
same-sex couples (lowest for heterosexual cohabiting). Husbands (male mates) are on 
average 2.14 (1.71) years older than their wives (female mates), and their average non-labor 
income difference amounts to $ 2,898 (35.16). Pairs of roommates exhibit very similar 
labor supply and wage patterns between mates, who also share the same education level. 
Their average age and income differences are 1.24 and $ 892 in female pairs, and 1.28 and 
$ 1043 for male roommates.  
 
5.   Results 
5.1.  Main Evidence 
The main results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. The estimated effects of the non-labor 
income difference and age difference are significant for both heads and partners, and their 
signs go in the direction predicted by the theory. The point estimates indicate that in lesbian 
couples (columns 1 and 2 of Table 2) being 5 years younger reduces the younger heads’ 
annual labor supply by about 23 hours (P value = .045), while their partners’ is increased 
by 35 hours (P value = .072). As to the other bargaining power variable, owning five 
thousand dollars more non-labor income implies a decline in heads’ labor supply of 19 
hours (P value = .043), and an increase in their partners’ of 47 hours per year (P value = 
.002). Gay couples exhibit a similar impact (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2). Their estimated 
coefficients correspond to -23 and 37 heads’ and partners’ hours worked for a five year 
younger head (P values .088 and .02), while the impact of a five thousand dollar income 
gap amounts to -32 and 41 annual hours worked by heads and partners, respectively (P 
values .004 and .031). The evidence clearly shows that all same-sex couples exhibit 
statistically significant responses to bargaining power forces. The younger (richer) partner 
holds a more favorable bargaining position and lowers his/her labor supply, while his/her 
mate increases his/her labor supply. Moreover, these labor supply responses are not 
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Table 2, the heterosexual cohabiting sample exhibits a similar pattern of effects to 
homosexual households. Married couples differ from all types of cohabiting households in 
that they attribute more bargaining power to the older spouse, and the magnitude of the 
effects of the income and age differences is smaller, especially for females (columns 11 and 
12 of Table 2). Specifically, heterosexual cohabiting couples’ labor supply effects of a five 
year age difference are -18 and 20 hours, while a $ 5,000 income difference generates an 
estimated hour change of -21 and 27 hours for male and female mates, respectively. For 
husbands and wives, the corresponding age and income effects amount to 15 and -7 hours, 
and -17 and 14 hours.  
These estimated bargaining power forces and labor supply responses are sizable, 
corresponding to several days of work a year. The concurrent impact on both partners, and 
with opposite outcomes, is remarkable given the acknowledged rigidities in the labor 
supplies, and the frequency of the reported labor supply peaking around 40 hours of work 
per week. Traditional analyses do not emphasize changes by both spouses, let alone their 
labor supply responding to bargaining power forces. Moreover, no study finds that same-
sex households’ labor supply decisions reflect the collective household behavior of 
heterosexual couples and are influenced by bargaining factors such as non-labor income 
ownership and age. The intra-household decision process does not appear to vary by sexual 
orientation. These findings also show that income pooling does not hold for either 
heterosexual or same-sex couples. So far, the income pooling hypothesis and the unitary 
model prediction that bargaining power forces are irrelevant to intra-household decisions 
had been empirically rejected only for heterosexual households (Browning et al., 1994, 
Schultz, 1990, Thomas, 1990). 
As to the age gap, in both same-sex and opposite-sex cohabiting couples, the 
younger mate exhibits more bargaining power, while married couples are found to value 
being relatively old, controlling for wages and education of each partner and individual age. 
This evidence on married households corresponds to what is found in the literature, where 
the spouses’ age difference is considered a traditional measure of bargaining power, and the 
older spouse, not the younger, has a favorable position (e.g. Browning et al., 1994, Lyons, 
Neelakantan, Fava, 2008). These studies focus on household expenditures and financial 
decisions of married couples, and do not control for wages, hours worked, or actual 
earnings, so that being older also captures higher earning capacity and labor market 
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individual labor market characteristics are disentangled from age and specifically controlled 
for, married couples still value being relatively old, while relative youth enhances 
bargaining power in all cohabiting relationships, across sexual orientations.  
These results also match the evidence from psychological studies on family 
relationships. Patterson (2000) reports that the partner with greater financial resources tends 
to have more power within the couple, in both homosexual and heterosexual unions. 
Moreover, no difference in break-up rates is found between lesbian and gay couples, with 
only married couples exhibiting a lower dissolution rate (Caldwell and Peplau, 1984, 
Kurdek, 1998, Patterson, 2000). The more stable and durable relationship of married 
couples may make spouses less responsive to outside opportunities and bargaining power. 
This would explain why in all cohabiting relationship I find that the younger partner has 
more bargaining power, since cohabitants have lower barriers to leave and younger 
individuals have better outside options. The signal conveyed by relative youth about the 
quality of outside opportunities may be more relevant for cohabiting rather than married 
couples, and represent a more credible threat, because the former are aware that their 
household is less stable, lacking the commitment of legal marriage (Kurdek, 1998). In 
married couples, the life experience, knowledge and maturity of the older spouse play an 
important role of guidance in the stability of the relationship and are valued by the younger 
spouse (Fava et al., 2008). Jepsen and Jepsen (2002) as well find that same-sex couples are 
more similar to cohabiting than to married opposite-sex couples. Finally, wives’ smaller 
bargaining power effects may be also due to stronger rigidities in their labor supply 
schedules. The more common presence of children within marriage than in cohabiting 
couples, and especially than in same-sex couples
14, may make spouses, and wives in 
particular, less likely to respond to bargaining power in terms of labor supply shifts. 
As to the other covariates in the labor supply equations, most parameter estimates 
for all couples are comparable to the literature. In particular, the mates’ own wage response 
is always positive significant, as is the cross-wage effects between mates’ labor supplies 
(Table 3). The couple’s total non-labor income and own age have a negative effect on labor 
supply, while education has a positive impact, although the coefficients are not always 
precisely estimated. Being black is associated with fewer hours of work, as own household 
                                                 
14 In my samples, the average number of household children is 1.29 in married couples, .90 in heterosexual 
cohabiting couples, and .40 and .23 in lesbian and gay couples.  
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children, except for heterosexual male mates for whom children have a positive effect on 
labor supply. This is mostly in line with the findings in the family labor supply literature. 
For instance, Chiappori et al. (2002) run similar spouses’ labor supply equations and show 
positive significant cross wage effects,  negative own age estimates and positive significant 
own wage effects for wives.  
The bargaining power effect is also estimated on pairs of male and female 
roommates. The results are detailed in columns 7 to 10 of Table 2. Their labor supply 
regressions show no significant impact of either the income or age differences, as theory 
predicts. This lack of impact on roommates strengthens my bargaining power interpretation 
of the labor supply responses of same-sex and opposite-sex couples’. Finally, the disparity 
between same-sex couples’ and roommates’ behavior confirms that the sample of same-sex 
couples is indeed formed by homosexual partners rather than by roommates who wrongly 
identify themselves as “unmarried partners”. 
These findings represent the first empirical support for the labor supplies of gay and 
lesbian households to be affected by bargaining power forces, and emphasize that same-sex 
household decision making reflect heterosexual households’ behavior, more closely to 
cohabiting than married couples. Bargaining power is found to be positively related to non-
labor income ownership in all types of couples, whereas relative youth increases bargaining 
power in all cohabiting couples but decreases it in married couples.  
Further evidence presented below, together with the discussion of various 
alternative explanations, should help making my results convincing and contribute to the 
understanding of the economic behavior of gay and lesbian families. 
 Table 2. Labor Supply Effects of Age and Non-Labor Income differences on Lesbian, Gay, Heterosexual Cohabiting and Married Couples
Lesbian Couples Gay Couples
Heads Partners Heads Partners Male Mates Female Mates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age_diff 4.61 ** -6.97 *** 4.67 *** -7.48 ** 3.57 *** -3.94***
(2.30) (3.88) (2.74) (3.21) (.52) (.454)
Y_diff -.0037 ** .0095 * -.0065 * .0081 ** -.0042 *** .0053***
(.0018) (.0031) (.0022) (.0038) (.0006) (.0007)
Number  of observations 2950 2950 2588 2588 68762 68762
Heads Partners Heads Partners Husbands Wives
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Age_diff 3.44 -0.875 3.01 2.15 -3.003 ***     1.43**
(3.56) (1.87) (2.68) (2.01) (.608) (.688)
Y_diff .0007 .0002 -.0011 -.001 -.0034 *** .0028***
(.0006) (.0006) (.009) (.0009) (.0004) (.0008)
Number  of observations 8480 8480 9657 9657 96650 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section III. Regressions are corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait.
Heterosexual Cohabiting Couples
Heterosexual Married Couples Female Roommates Male Roommates
 
  20Table 3. Estimation of the Labor Supply Regressions of Lesbian, Gay, Heterosexual Cohabiting and Married Couples
Heads Partners Heads Partners Male  Female Husbands Wives
   (1) (2)    (3) (4)     (5) (6)     (7) (8)
Age_diff 4.61 ** -6.97 *** 4.67 *** -7.48 ** 3.57 *** -3.94 *** -3.003 *** 1.43 **
(2.30) (3.88) (2.74) (3.21) (.521) (.454) (.608) (.688)
Y_diff -.0037 ** .0095 * -.0065 * .0081 ** -.0042 *** .0053*** -.0034 *** .0028 ***
(.0018) (.0031) (.0022) (.0038) (.0006) (.0007) (.0004) (.0008)
Couple's non-labor income Y -.0086 *** -.0085 ** -.0052 *** -.0128 *** -.007 *** -.0076 *** -.0066 *** -.0087 **
(.0015) (.0035) (.0018) (.0032) (.0004) (.0005) (.0004) (.0008)
Log of wage of head 175.20 **
*
* 558.17 ** 270.83 *** 217.27 172.94 *** 194.39 *** 161.62 *** 179.49 ***
(57.05) (285.06) (61.08) (235.95) (40.29) (36.23) (30.99) (43.89)
Log of wage of partner 171.98 151.71 *** 310.98 104.62 *** 92.37 *** 590.57 ** 192.06 *** 137.83 ***
(73.09) ** (22.92) (423.69) (26.04) (17.26) (283.88) (38.08) (32.23)
Own Age  -1.81 -4.92 -6.09 ** -4.75 -6.20 *** 0.35 -7.49 *** -3.07
(2.31) (4.05) (2.49) (3.66) (.678) (.485) (.71) (.598)
Education of head 68.02 ** 176.70 * -91.83 ** -15.25 17.47 *** 4.22 10.5 *** -42.78 ***
(21.99) (105.56) (39.74) (31.71) (3.79) (6.16) (3.44) (7.29)
Education of partner 125.53 -6.27 10.67 * 14.02 -82.81 *** 38.28 -90.60 *** 46.87 **
(90.64) (12.10) (25.86) (14.63) (16.43) (26.94) (11.61) (20.64)
Number of children of head -45.40 *** -50.58 *** -17.53 -33.68 22.17 *** -83.86 *** 18.46 *** -110.00 ***
(15.43) (13.43) (41.07) (31.51) (4.83) (4.27) (2.09) (4.77)
Number of children of partner 71.42 * -16.54 32.46 *** -116.08 -22.73 *** -32.98 *** dropped because same as
(43.73) (48.47) (91.61) (139.93) (3.29) (4.54) number of head's childre
Dummy for Black -117.43 **
n
* -108.35 ** -173.89 *** -214.40 ** -144.73 *** 5.39 -246.65 *** 152.77 *
(47.43) (54.10) (66.84) (108.73) (8.91) (11.54) (11.66) (24.79)
Number  of observations 2950 2950 2588 2588 68762 68762 96650 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated coefficients, standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered by state.
Regressions run with the covariates described in Section III. Regressions are corrected for sample selection with Heckman MLE.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait.
Heterosexual Heterosexual
Gay Couples Lesbian Couples Cohabiting Couples Married Couples
  21I test the restrictions on the proportionality of the partners’ labor supply responses to the 
non-labor income and age differences, and I recover the estimated effects of non-labor 
income, mates’ wages and the two bargaining power factors on the sharing rule, as 







Results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. As predicted by the theory (the 
condition   holds in my samples), the ratios of the coefficients on y_diff and 
age_diff are not statistically different across mates, and this proportionality holds for all 
types of couples, as shown in Table 4. Table 5 reports the estimated parameters of the 
sharing rule. In lesbian couples, a five years age gap (a $ 5,000 non-labor income gap) will 
induce the older (poorer) partner to transfer an additional $ 1915 ($ 1560) of the couple’s 
non-labor income to the younger (richer) partner. In gay couples, these figures correspond 
to transfer an additional $ 1515 ($ 2100) of income to the younger (richer) partner. In 
heterosexual cohabiting couples, a more favorable bargaining position increases the 
younger (richer) partner’s share of income by $ 1360 ($ 1600), while in married couples 
being 5 years older ($ 5,000 richer) corresponds to an increase in $ 865 (980) of the older 
(richer) spouse’s share. These findings suggest that bargaining power forces do affect the 
intra-household allocation of resources, of same-sex couples as well. Table 5 also shows 
that earning higher wages translates into the transfer of more non-labor income to the 
higher earner, and that a $ 1.00 increase in the couple’s total non-labor income increases 
the head’s share of household non-labor income by 70 cents for lesbians, 34 cents for gay 
couples, 54 cents for cohabiting and 38 cents for married couples. 
5.2.  Additional Findings 
Distribution factors have sizable effects on same-sex households’ decisions. The 
unitary model prediction that bargaining power forces are irrelevant to intra-household 
decisions, and the income pooling hypothesis, are rejected for all households alike, 
homosexual or heterosexual, cohabiting or married.  Table 4.  Proportionality Tests on the Effects of Age and Non-Labor Income Differences on Lesbian, Gay and Heterosexual Couples
Estimated Ratio of Coefficients
Heads Partners Heads Partners Male  Female Husbands Wives
   (1) (2)    (3) (4)     (5) (6)     (7) (8)
coefficient of Y_diff -.0008 ** -.0013 * -.0014 * -.0011 * -.0011 *** -.0013 ***   '.0011 *** .0019*
coefficient of Age_diff (.0037) (.0008) (.0011) (.0006) (.0002) (.0002) (.0002) (.001)
Test of equality of this ratio 
between heads and partners P = .34 P = .35 P = .489 P = .367
Number  of observations 2950 2950 2588 2588 68762 68762 96650 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
* ; ** ; *** significant at 10 %, 5% and 1 %. Estimated ratio of coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis. 
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).
For heterosexual couples, it is the male mate's trait minus the female mate's trait. Heads and partners become male and female mates.
Lesbian Couples Cohabiting Couples
Heterosexual






  23Table 5.  Sharing Rule for Lesbian, Gay, Heterosexual Cohabiting and Married Couples 
Estimated Coefficients of the Head's share of a couple's non-labor income
Lesbian Couples Cohabiting Couples
Age_diff -383 -303 -272 173
Y_diff  .312 .420 .32 .196
Y .71 .34 .54 .38
log of wage of head  18358 11205 11760 12844
log of wage of partner -14301 -20174 -7041 -11096
Number  of observations 2950 2588 68762 96650
Data from the U.S. Census year 2000, five percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Set (PUMS). 
The above coefficients represent the change in the head's share of the couple's non-labor income Y.
Age_diff (Y_diff) is defined as head's age (total non-labor income) minus partner's age (total non-labor income).






  245.  Alternative Explanations 
The predicted opposite labor supply effects on both mates, the lack of any impact on 
roommates, and the proportionality restrictions are very unlikely to hold unless my 
bargaining power explanation and the collective household approach are correct and 
applicable to same-sex couples. Furthermore, I argue that the following phenomena cannot 
consistently explain my results, given my intra-household bargaining predictions and 
empirical evidence. 
 
5.1. Bargaining power variables as proxies for local labor market conditions and 
attitudes toward gays and lesbians 
It may be possible that the labor supply of the younger or richer homosexual partner falls 
not as a result of the bargaining power effect, but due to poor local economic opportunities 
and/or unfriendly attitudes toward gays or lesbians. Similarly, it could be that younger and 
richer heterosexual women work less, and their male partners work more, because they face 
worse job opportunities than men. There are at least three reasons to believe that the local 
economy and attitude hypothesis does not provide a plausible alternative explanation for 
my findings. First, my labor supply regressions include individuals’ wages and education, 
own age, and state fixed effects (alternatively, state unemployment rate, total and female 
labor force participation rate, and dummy variables for state legal provisions for 
homosexual couples) which account for the variation in labor market opportunities and 
attitudes. My findings are also robust to adding individual controls for occupation 
categories in my labor supply regressions. Second, the predicted labor supply changes have 
a distinctive opposite impact on the members of each type of couple. It is difficult to 
understand why the labor supply of a gay or lesbian individual should be lower while 
his/her partner is higher, when they share the same gender and sexual orientation, and thus 
the same labor market conditions and potential earnings discrimination. Third, gay and 
lesbian workers exhibit an opposite earnings differential with respect to their heterosexual 
counterparts, lesbians earning significantly more than heterosexual women, and gay men 
earning significantly less than heterosexual men (Allegretto and Arthur, 2001, Black et al., 
2003, Jepsen, 2007). If it were a gender effect, labor market conditions would not explain 
my findings of a same pattern of results for gays, lesbians and heterosexuals alike. Finally, 
pairs of male and female roommates do not exhibit any labor supply effect of age and 
  25income differences, while sharing the same gender and labor market characteristics as 
homosexual couples. As to heterosexual couples, it is hard to reconcile with labor market 
disparities the opposite effect of relative age on cohabiting and married individuals, when 
they share the same gender, sexual orientation and similar age, wage and education profiles. 
 
5.2.  Age, non-labor income and labor supply 
Controlling for own age and wage, the age difference between mates should not capture an 
individual’s marginal utility of leisure and affect his/her labor supply through this channel. 
However, younger cohabitants do not work less than older or married workers, as instead 
my bargaining power effects show. Matching preferences either do not provide a plausible 
alternative explanation for my findings. Older individuals may prefer to have a partnership 
with younger persons, but this youth value does not translate into a lower preference for 
leisure. Matching with younger individuals does not necessarily affect the marginal utility 
from leisure making the older partner work more. Actually, the opposite may be more 
likely, the younger your companion is, the more you value leisure and the less you work. 
On the other hand, if an older partner needs to work more hours to earn more income to 
“buy” a relationship with a younger partner, then this exactly illustrates the bargaining 
power effect at stake in this study
15. 
The same reasoning holds for non-labor income differences. In particular, if non-
labor income is endogenous to labor supply choices, then it is likely that high non-labor 
income suggests high labor supply. If an individual’s disutility from work is low, he/she 
works many hours and as a result owns a high non-labor income. However, this 
endogeneity bias can not explain my findings since it would predict more hours of work 
with higher income, whereas my bargaining power effects predict that higher non-labor 
income differences lead to lower labor supply, and roommates do not exhibit any labor 
supply impact. Finally, non-labor income has been treated as an exogenous measure of 
bargaining power by the literature (Browning et al, 1994 and Thomas, 1990). 
 
                                                 
15 The same, reversed, argument holds for married couples, for whom being relatively old is the favorable 
trait. 
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5.3.  Household specialization 
Bargaining power variables such as income and age difference may somewhat capture 
differential productivity in household production. However, controlling for own age, and 
education and wages of both mates, should ensure that comparative advantage and 
household productivity is disentangled from my bargaining power measures. Besides, there 
is no specific economic reason why the younger partner should specialize in household 
production and work less, while the older partner works more in the labor market, married 
couples exhibiting the opposite pattern. A similar argument holds for non-labor income 
ownership. Being relatively richer does not imply being more productive at home and 
working less in the labor market. Also, this specialization pattern would not necessarily be 
present in all types of couples, gay, lesbian and heterosexual alike. Finally, the literature 
emphasizes the specialization effect mainly for married heterosexual couples, while most of 
my samples consist of unmarried couples, including homosexuals. 
 
5.4.  Misreporting of same-sex partners in the Census data 
The Census identifies same-sex partners by their cohabiting relationship with an individual 
of the same gender who records his/her “relationship to the head of the household” as 
“unmarried partner”. Unfortunately, the 2000 Census modified the relationship to head 
from “spouse” to “unmarried partner” and/or the marital status from married to unmarried, 
for couples with both mates of the same sex, without signaling the allocated values in the 
flag variable of relationship to head. As documented in Black et al. (2006), this procedure 
lead to consider several heterosexual married couples as same-sex couples who wrongly 
reported their sex or relationship to head. To avoid this misclassification, all individuals 
with imputed values for marital status, sex, and relationship to head were excluded from my 
samples, using the corresponding “q” variables which flag allocated values, as suggested by 
Black et al. (2006) and Jepsen and Jepsen (2002). Overall, more than forty percent of same-
sex couples are dropped because of these imputed values, whereas only very few 
heterosexual couples are affected (four percent of cohabitants and less than one percent of 
married couples). This process ensures that the same-sex couples at stake are real 
homosexual partnerships, rather than heterosexuals misreporting their gender or 
  27relationship to head, although homosexuals who wrongly identify themselves as married 
are also dropped (by year 2000, no US state had legalized same-sex marriages)
  16. The 
concern that sentimentally un-related individuals voluntarily identify themselves as 
unmarried partners (rather than roommates) is minimal, given the stigma attached to 
homosexuality. However, both of these last two instances of mis-reporting would work 
against my findings of same-sex couples behaving as heterosexual families. Finally, sexual 
orientation is inferred from self-reported data and under-reporting of homosexual status 
(identifying as “unmarried partner”) may be correlated with demographic characteristics 
such as education and income. At any rate, there is no reason why mis-reporting is more 
severe in the Census than in the other smaller homosexuals’ data sets, and in principle it 






                                                 
16 Including the observations with Census-allocated marital status yields very similar patterns of bargaining 
power effects, at higher significance levels. 
 
  286. Conclusions 
This is the first study of same-sex couples’ labor supplies as an endogenous 
household choice, and the first empirical support for gay and lesbian households’ labor 
supplies to be affected by bargaining power forces, in the direction predicted by the theory 
for heterosexual households. In particular, I show that gay and lesbian couples do behave as 
heterosexual couples, their labor supplies being responsive to differences in age and non-
labor income between partners. At the same time, no effect is found on same-sex pairs of 
roommates, consistently with the household bargaining interpretation.  
Using 2000 US Census data, I find that each gay and lesbian partner’s labor supply 
is negatively related to their level of bargaining power. Specifically, a relatively lower age 
(higher non-labor income) significantly reduces the younger (richer) partner’s labor supply, 
while it significantly increases the labor supply of his/her relatively older (poorer) mate, 
controlling for both partners’ wages, education and other individual and household 
characteristics. Results are similar for gay, lesbian and heterosexual cohabiting couples 
alike. Married couples attribute a more favorable position to the older spouse, or the richer, 
with significant but somewhat smaller bargaining power effects. Additionally, I cannot 
statistically reject the proportionality constraints on the partners’ labor supply responses to 
the two bargaining power factors, as predicted by the collective household labor supply 
model. Finally, the sharing rule with which partners divide their household non-labor 
resources is recovered, highlighting that a favorable age difference and/or non-labor income 
difference increases a mate’s allocated income share, in all types of couples.  
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